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Federal lawmakers are considering legisla-
tion that could result in millions more middle-
income families obtaining health insurance
from government. Unfortunately, the debate
over expansion of the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program is divorced from the reality
of who truly needs assistance and the forces that
are making health insurance increasingly unaf-
fordable. 
SCHIP and its larger sibling Medicaid cur-
rently enroll many people who do not need gov-
ernment assistance, including some families of
four earning up to $72,000 per year. That is a
direct result of federal funding rules that reward
states for making more Americans dependent
on government for their health care. 
Rather than expand SCHIP, Congress should
(1) make private health insurance more afford-
able by allowing consumers and employers to
purchase less expensive policies from other states,
and (2) fold federal Medicaid and SCHIP funding
into block grants that no longer encourage states
to open taxpayer-financed health care to non-
needy families. With more Americans able to
afford private insurance and no incentive for
states to expand government programs beyond
the truly needy, federal and state governments
could reduce spending on those programs.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Federal lawmakers are considering legisla-
tion that could result in millions more mid-
dle-income families obtaining health insur-
ance from government. Congress created the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program
in 1997. That program provides federal
grants to states that provide federally defined
health insurance coverage to eligible chil-
dren.1 In 2006, SCHIP spent approximately
$8 billion to cover 7.4 million individuals.2
SCHIP’s original goal was to provide health
insurance to children whose family income is
too high to qualify for Medicaid yet too low
to afford private health insurance. Medicaid
is the much larger federal-state health insur-
ance program targeted presumably at the
poorest Americans. Medicaid spends far
more than SCHIP (see Figure 1) and covers
60.9 million people.3
SCHIP has grown well beyond its original
purpose. The program currently enrolls 6.6
million children,4 many from families that
are neither needy nor even low-income. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that
maintaining existing SCHIP benefits for the
next five years would require an additional $8
billion of federal funding above and beyond
existing funding levels.5 President Bush has
proposed increasing spending by $5 billion
over five years.6 Democrats in Congress have
proposed increasing federal SCHIP spending
by as much as $60 billion over five years,7
which would allow states to open SCHIP to
far more non-needy families.
Expanding SCHIP or even maintaining
current enrollment levels would force taxpay-
ers to finance health insurance for many fam-
ilies who are capable of obtaining it them-
selves. A better strategy for providing health
care to those in need would use deregulation
to make private health insurance more
affordable for middle- and low-income fami-
lies, thereby allowing government health pro-
grams to focus on those patients who most
need assistance. This paper proposes a two-
part strategy for improving health care access:
(1) block-granting federal Medicaid and
SCHIP funding to encourage states to reded-
icate those programs to the truly needy and
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Total Spending (2006): SCHIP vs. Medicaid 
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Detailed Projections for Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health
Insurance Program,” March 6, 2007, pp. 8–9, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7861/m_m_schip.pdf; and author’s
calculations.
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(2) using competitive federalism to make pri-
vate health insurance affordable for more
low-wage earners. 
Medicaid & SCHIP
Medicaid and SCHIP provide necessary
medical services to millions of people. At the
same time, these programs have significant
downsides. For example, there are indica-
tions that Medicaid and SCHIP err on the
side of providing too much assistance. That
is, they induce many people to become
dependent on government for medical care
and in some cases trap enrollees in depen-
dence. Medicaid and SCHIP weaken private
health care markets by crowding out private
health insurance and driving up prices for
private purchasers. Expanding SCHIP or
Medicaid would exacerbate these problems. 
Covering People Who Don’t Need
Charity
Medicaid and SCHIP have grown beyond
their original purposes and well beyond what
is necessary to provide health insurance to
needy Americans. Many Medicaid enrollees
are elderly nursing home residents who could
have obtained private long-term care insur-
ance. Economists Jeffrey Brown of the
University of Illinois and Amy Finkelstein of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
estimate that Medicaid’s loose eligibility
rules discourage 66 percent to 90 percent of
seniors from purchasing such insurance.8
Indeed, a cottage industry of Medicaid estate
planners exists to help middle-class seniors
spend Medicaid funds, rather than their own
resources, on their nursing home care.9 Other
Medicaid enrollees come from non-elderly
families that could obtain health insurance
on their own. More than one out of every five
people eligible for Medicaid actually has pri-
vate health insurance,10 suggesting that
Medicaid’s eligibility criteria are overly broad.
Likewise, SCHIP has grown well beyond
its original purpose of providing health
insurance to children unable to obtain pri-
vate insurance but too affluent to qualify for
Medicaid. When Congress created SCHIP in
1996, more than 60 percent of eligible chil-
dren already had private health insurance.11
In 2005, about 55 percent of SCHIP-eligible
children had private health insurance.12
Depending on the state, SCHIP now provides
health insurance to children in families earn-
ing up to 350 percent of the federal poverty
level (FPL) or more.13 For a family of four,
that is the equivalent of nearly $72,000 per
year.14 New York wants to increase its SCHIP
eligibility cutoff to 400 percent of the FPL,15
or roughly $82,000 per year for a family of
four.16 Nationwide, an estimated 89 percent
of children in families earning between 300
percent and 400 percent of the FPL already
have private coverage.17 As a basis for com-
parison, median family income for all fami-
lies in 2005 was just over $56,000.18 That sug-
gests that if all states raised their eligibility
cutoff to New York’s proposed level, well over
half of all families could enroll their children
in a government health program. Finally,
SCHIP also enrolls some 670,000 adults.19
As a result of past Medicaid and SCHIP
expansions, the share of children eligible for
those programs rose from less than one fifth
in 1987 to nearly one half in 2002.20 That is,
despite the fact that the share of children liv-
ing in poverty actually fell over the same peri-
od (see Figure 2).21 Medicaid and SCHIP eli-
gibility criteria are broader than what would
be necessary to cover only those who truly
need assistance. 
A Deeper Low-Wage Trap
A frequently overlooked downside of
Medicaid and SCHIP is that government pro-
grams targeting those below a given income
threshold create disincentives for beneficia-
ries to increase their earnings. As a low-
income family’s earnings rise, the family pays
higher taxes and loses Medicaid, SCHIP, and
other government benefits. The combination
of higher taxes and lost subsidies means that
when a family increases its earnings by $100,
its total income rises by only a small fraction
of that amount. In many instances, a family
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that increases its earnings can end up with
less income overall.
For example, a low-income single mother
of two in New Mexico is eligible for a number
of income-related subsidies from the federal
and state governments. These include the
Earned Income Tax Credit, cash assistance,
Food Stamps, WIC,22 housing subsidies,
child care subsidies, and Medicaid.23 Figure 3
shows what happens if that hypothetical
mother increases her earnings. The combina-
tion of progressively higher taxes and the
progressive loss of government subsidies
means that even if she increases her earnings
from about $15,000 to $45,000, her net
income remains the same at about $40,000.24
Of the $30,000 she adds to her earnings, she
loses $4,000 to taxes and $26,000 to reduced
benefits. As a result of programs such as
SCHIP, low-income families in New Mexico
and other states face marginal effective tax
rates that can exceed 100 percent. Such fami-
lies have almost no financial incentive to
achieve self-sufficiency, because increasing
their earnings often has zero effect on their
actual income. 
Expanding SCHIP would magnify those
powerful disincentives to increase family
earnings and would ensnare even more fami-
lies in what economists call the “low-wage
trap”25 created by such programs.
That low-wage trap would be deepened fur-
ther because Medicaid and SCHIP increase
health care prices for private purchasers. For
example, Medicaid price controls increase the
cost of prescription drugs for private payers by
an estimated 13 percent.26 Government pur-
chasing through Medicaid and SCHIP also can
increase prices for private purchasers through
what is commonly believed to be “cost shift-
ing,” but may be more accurately described as
crowding out private purchasers.27 Thus ex-
panding SCHIP (and Medicaid) not only would
induce greater dependence on government, it
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Percent of Children Eligible for Government Health Insurance vs. Living in Poverty
would make financial independence more diffi-
cult even for those who do not enroll.
Poor Fiscal Sense
Expanding SCHIP also would be fiscally
unwise. First, expanding coverage may not be
the best way to improve the health of target-
ed children. Although policymakers expect
that expanding Medicaid and SCHIP will
improve children’s health, economists have
found no evidence that these programs are a
cost-effective way of doing so. Economists
Helen Levy and David Meltzer write:
It is clear that expanding health insur-
ance is not the only way to improve
health. . . . Policies could also be aimed at
factors that may fundamentally con-
tribute to poor health, such as poverty
and low levels of education. There is no
evidence at this time that money aimed at
improving health would be better spent
on expanding insurance coverage than
on any of these other possibilities.28
In a survey of economic studies examining
factors that contribute to longevity, the New
York Times reported that education appears
to have the greatest impact, while “factors
that are popularly believed to be crucial—
money and health insurance, for example,
pale in comparison.”29 According to RAND
Corporation health economist James Smith,
health insurance “is vastly overrated in the
policy debate” over how to increase life
expectancy.30
One reason that Medicaid and SCHIP may
not be cost-effective vehicles for improving
health is that expanding those programs
reduces private health insurance coverage.
Families often substitute Medicaid and
SCHIP for private coverage. Similarly, employ-
ers often cut or eliminate health benefits when
their workers become eligible for those pro-
grams. It is well-established that Medicaid and
SCHIP “crowd out” private health insurance.31
Crowd-out makes expansion of public
programs a costly way of increasing the num-
ber of people with health insurance. A recent
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study by economists Jonathan Gruber (MIT)
and Kosali Simon (Cornell University) esti-
mates that as a result of crowd-out, “the
number of privately insured falls by about 60
percent as much as the number of publicly
insured rises.”32
To illustrate, suppose that Congress and
the states were to enroll 10 million addition-
al people in Medicaid or SCHIP. As a result,
the number of people with private health
insurance would decline by about 6 million.
Though taxpayers would be financing health
care for an additional 10 million people, the
number of uninsured would fall only by 4
million. In other words, Medicaid and SCHIP
cover four uninsured people for the price of
10. Crowd-out is more likely to occur when
lawmakers open these programs to higher-
income families, because those families are
more likely to have private health insurance
already.33
Expanding SCHIP also makes poor fiscal
sense because spending on Medicaid and
SCHIP is already on an unsustainable path.
Cato Institute senior fellow Jagadeesh Gokhale
estimates that maintaining existing Medicaid
growth rates would require implausibly high
tax rates in the future. According to Gokhale,
“Limiting Medicaid spending growth is . . . an
essential component of putting the federal
budget on a sustainable course without impos-
ing crushing tax burdens on younger and
future generations.”34
Nevertheless, lawmakers appear ready to
let the poorest Americans carry the burden of
a SCHIP expansion. Congress is considering
financing a SCHIP expansion with a 156-per-
cent increase in the federal cigarette tax, from
39 cents to $1 per pack.35 According to
Harvard economist Kip Viscusi:
Cigarette taxes fall predominantly on
the very poor. The usual concerns
about regressive taxes involve those
that are regressive in percentage terms,
that is, the poor pay a higher percent-
age of their income in taxes than do
the wealthy. Cigarette taxes are actually
so regressive that the poor pay a much
higher absolute level of taxes than do
the wealthy. In 1990, people who made
under $10,000 per year paid almost
twice as much in cigarette taxes as
those who made $50,000 and above.36
An increase in the cigarette tax would force
the poorest Americans to subsidize health
insurance for families earning up to $82,000
per year. 
Moreover, a higher federal cigarette tax
would lead to more violent crime. Tax
Foundation chief economist Patrick Fleenor
has documented that high cigarette taxes
fuel black market activity, including truck
hijackings and other armed robberies. In
2003, Fleenor wrote: 
Today, 200 cases of cigarettes in a mod-
est-sized transport truck would have a
retail value in New York City of around
$1 million and would be [a] tempting
target for thieves.37
Increasing the federal cigarette tax would cre-
ate an even greater incentive for armed
thieves to rob retailers and hijack cigarette
trucks. 
Why Do Medicaid and
SCHIP Cover Non-Needy
Families?
Medicaid and SCHIP cover many non-
needy families as a result of the incentives that
the federal government creates for state gov-
ernments. Overall, 57 percent of Medicaid
spending comes from the federal treasury,
with 43 percent coming from states.38 Much
as it did under the old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children cash assistance program,
the federal government “matches” every dollar
a state puts toward its Medicaid program with
at least one dollar from the federal treasury.
The federal Medicaid “match” is completely
open-ended. States can therefore double their
money without limit by increasing Medicaid
enrollment and benefits.39 Poorer states such
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as Mississippi can even quadruple their money
without limit. 
Medicaid even creates opportunities for
states to push even more of their Medicaid
costs onto taxpayers in other states than fed-
eral law would seem to permit. For example,
the federal government is supposed to
finance only half of California’s Medicaid
program. A recent proposal by Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger (R), however, would bend
Medicaid’s rules so that taxpayers in other
states would finance three-fourths of
Schwarzenegger’s proposed new spending.40
Since states pay only a fraction of the cost
of expanding Medicaid to non-needy fami-
lies, the Medicaid “match” encourages such
expansions. Like the former AFDC program,
Medicaid’s funding mechanism creates a
“pay-for-dependence” incentive, rewarding
states that increase the number of Americans
dependent on government. The states’ open-
ended entitlement to federal dollars—or
more precisely, to the earnings of taxpayers in
other states—likewise increases the damage
that Medicaid does to private markets.
As with Medicaid, the federal government
matches state outlays for SCHIP, though at
higher rates. Overall, 69 percent of SCHIP
spending comes from the federal treasury,
with 31 percent coming from the states.41 At a
minimum, the federal SCHIP “match” allows
states to triple their money. In some cases,
states with a high proportion of low-income
uninsured children can nearly quintuple their
SCHIP outlays.42 Unlike Medicaid, the federal
government caps its contribution to each
state’s SCHIP program at a pre-determined
amount, which ostensibly denies states an
open-ended entitlement to the earnings of tax-
payers in other states.
Nevertheless, the cap on federal SCHIP
allotments is not as binding as it might
appear.  States such as Georgia sometimes
spend all of their allotted SCHIP funds
before the end of the fiscal year. The CBO
estimates that 11 states will do so in 2007.43
Typically, those states then petition the fed-
eral government for additional funding.44 So
far, Congress has twice bailed out such
states,45 effectively rewarding states that
commit to spend more federal dollars than
they have been allotted.
Given federal funding rules, states have
little incentive to tailor Medicaid or SCHIP
to cover only the truly needy. Instead, they
face rather large incentives to expand those
programs to people who do not need assis-
tance.
Refocus Aid on the 
Truly Needy
Congress should apply the same solution
to SCHIP and Medicaid that it applied to
AFDC in 1996. Reforming SCHIP and Medi-
caid as Congress reformed welfare would
reduce dependence on government and
encourage states to focus government health
care programs on those who truly need assis-
tance.
As with AFDC, Congress should end the
federal entitlement to Medicaid benefits and
stop funding state Medicaid and SCHIP pro-
grams with matching grants. As with AFDC,
Congress should replace those matching
grants with one block grant that neither
increases nor decreases with the size of a
state’s health care programs. As with AFDC,
Congress should place as few restrictions as
possible on how states spend their block
grants. Congress should give states the flexi-
bility to spend those funds at the state’s dis-
cretion on a few broad goals, such as:
1. Targeting medical assistance to the
truly needy, including the uninsurable;
2. Reducing dependence; and
3. Reducing crowd-out of private effort,
including charitable care.
As with AFDC, Congress should freeze the
overall amount it transfers to state health
care programs at current Medicaid and
SCHIP levels. If Congress were to freeze the
new block grants at 2007 levels, much as it
did with welfare reform, that would produce
a savings of $1.1 trillion over 10 years.46
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The most crucial element of the block-
grant approach is that states could not
obtain additional federal funding by expand-
ing their programs. That feature would dis-
courage states from expanding government
aid to individuals who could obtain health
insurance on their own. Block grants would
allow each state to preserve its Medicaid and
SCHIP programs just as they exist today.
States that wish to expand their programs
could continue to do so. However, states
would have to pay for such expansions them-
selves, rather than have taxpayers in other
states shoulder the burden. That would
encourage each state to focus its programs
on the truly needy. Over time, states would
learn from each other’s experiments at pro-
viding efficient care to those who truly need
assistance.
It makes little sense for residents of the 50
states to send their money to Washington, DC,
only to have Washington send that money
back to the states. Moreover, it is arguably
unconstitutional. The U.S. Constitution does
not grant Congress the power to provide
health care to the needy. Under the Tenth
Amendment, such “powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution . . . are
reserved to the states.”47 Converting federal
Medicaid and SCHIP funding to block grants
would do more than simply limit the growth of
government health care programs. Block
grants would take a step toward a more sound
and constitutional means of providing health
care for the needy, where the money never pass-
es through Congress’s hands.
Opponents will predict that block grants
would reduce access to care and increase the
number of uninsured. Opponents of welfare
reform made similar predictions, which
turned out to be inaccurate. When Congress
pared back cash assistance, welfare caseloads
plummeted and poverty decreased—often
dramatically—in every category. The poverty
rate remains lower today than at any point in
the 17 years leading up to 1996.48 Many who
opposed welfare reform have since admitted
that it accomplished a large measure of good. 
There are indications that a block-grant
approach to Medicaid and SCHIP could pro-
duce similar results. When the 1996 welfare
reform law eliminated Medicaid benefits for
noncitizen immigrants, opponents predicted
that coverage levels among noncitizen immi-
grants would drop. Instead, coverage levels
increased because more noncitizen immi-
grants obtained private health insurance.49
That experience supplies evidence that pri-
vate health insurance coverage expands in
response to a reduction in government cover-
age—sometimes enough to overwhelm the
reduction in government coverage.
Medicaid block grants were part of the
original 1996 welfare reform law until they
were dropped at the insistence of President
Clinton. Congress should revive the idea to
rededicate government health care spending
to those who truly need assistance.
Affordable Coverage via
Competitive Federalism
Another reason states have been eager to
expand their Medicaid programs has been
the rising cost of private health insurance.
State health insurance regulations have been
a driving force behind that trend. 
The average state requires consumers to
purchase 38 separate types of coverage.50
Forty-five states require all consumers, even
teetotalers, to purchase coverage for alco-
holism treatment. Thirty states require con-
sumers to pay for contraceptive coverage and
13 states require consumers to pay for cover-
age of in-vitro fertilization—even though
many consumers, such as some Catholics,
find those services morally objectionable.
Those coverage mandates increase the cost of
private health insurance by as much as 15 per-
cent.51 An estimated 25 percent of the unin-
sured lack coverage due to the cost of manda-
tory coverage laws.52 Underwriting restrictions
such as “community rating” laws, a type of
price control, further increase the cost of pri-
vate health insurance for many low-income
families, and likewise increase the number of
uninsured.53 Such regulations price many low-
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income families out of the market for private
health insurance. As many as 75 percent of the
uninsured could afford to purchase health
insurance54 but find that the available options
are not worth the high cost of coverage. 
Many individuals and employers who pur-
chase health insurance cannot avoid the
unwanted costs imposed by such regulations.
Under each state’s licensing laws, every
health insurance policy sold in that state
must include state-mandated coverage and
comply with the state’s price controls. 
Given the wide variation in health insur-
ance regulation from state to state55 and the
availability of lower-cost policies in some
states,56 many consumers and employers
should be able to obtain lower-cost health
insurance in other states, just as they purchase
many other products from out-of-state.
However, state licensing laws act as a barrier to
trade, preventing many Americans from
obtaining lower-cost health insurance. The
burden of these laws falls hardest on low-
income individuals; 75 percent of the unin-
sured have family incomes below 200 percent
of the federal poverty level (about $41,000 per
year for a family of four).57
A Health Insurance
Free-Trade Zone
Congress should sweep away those trade
barriers and let individuals and employers
purchase health insurance licensed in states
other than their own. Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power “To regulate Commerce . . . among the
several states.” That power exists primarily to
prevent each state from erecting barriers to
commerce from other states.58 Congress
should enact a federal law that prevents
states from barring the sale of an insurance
product licensed by another state.
Such a law would enable many low-
income, uninsured consumers to obtain pri-
vate health insurance, because it would
expand their range of choices to include poli-
cies free of unwanted regulatory costs. The
consumer protections required by the licens-
ing state, such as financial solvency require-
ments, could be incorporated into the insur-
ance contract. That would allow the purchaser
to enforce those requirements in the purchas-
er’s home state, with the help of his state’s
insurance regulators.
This “competitive federalism”59 approach
would improve the quality of health insurance
regulation. Giving consumers the freedom to
avoid unwanted regulatory costs would force
states to offer only the regulatory protections
that consumers demand. Otherwise, consumers
would take their business—and, importantly,
their premium taxes—to a state that provides
consumer-friendly regulation. Competition
among the states would drive insurance regula-
tion toward an equilibrium—or multiple equi-
libria—between too much and too little regula-
tion. States would be unlikely to engage in a
“race to the bottom” by eliminating important
consumer protections: the first people to be
injured by such unwise regulatory policies
would be the voters in that very state, who
would then punish the responsible officials.60
Competitive federalism would be a far
preferable means of making health insurance
affordable to low-income consumers than
federal preemption of state regulation.61
First, competitive federalism preserves each
state’s power to determine its health insur-
ance regulations. Second, competitive feder-
alism preserves each individual’s freedom to
choose the protections they demand. Third,
and most importantly, competitive federal-
ism would maintain constant pressure on
states not to enact costly regulations, because
consumers could choose policies licensed by
other states. 
If Congress were to preempt state health
insurance regulations, however, that would
effectively federalize the regulation of health
insurance.62 Over time, at the behest of special
interests, Congress would enact costly regula-
tion after costly regulation, just as state legis-
latures have.63 Those regulations would apply
nationwide, meaning that consumers—partic-
ularly low-income consumers—would have no
escape. 
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Competitive federalism also would be a
far preferable means of making health insur-
ance affordable to low-income consumers
than expanding SCHIP. Unlike SCHIP, com-
petitive federalism would require no govern-
ment spending and no tax increases. It would
not pull more families into a low-wage trap.
Indeed, competitive federalism would help
low-income families avoid dependence on
government. Competitive federalism would
not increase the cost of privately purchased
health care. If anything, by enabling a more
competitive health insurance market, it
would force insurers to put more downward
pressure on health care prices. Finally,
because competitive federalism would help
more low-income families become indepen-
dent, it would allow state governments to
focus their health care programs on those
who truly need assistance.
SCHIP’s Bootleggers
and Baptists
With so many reasons not to expand
SCHIP—including a lack of evidence on cost-
effectiveness and the availability of better
alternatives for making coverage affordable
for low-income families—why is there so
much support for expanding means-tested
government health insurance to people who
don’t need charity?
Support for SCHIP (and Medicaid) expan-
sion comes from an alliance of “bootleggers
and Baptists.” Economists often explain sup-
port for government policies (e.g., restric-
tions on alcohol sales) in terms of those who
truly believe in the merits of the policy (i.e.,
Baptists who oppose alcohol consumption)
and those who benefit financially from the
policy (i.e., the bootleggers who sell illicit
alcohol).64
The “Baptists” behind SCHIP expansion
are those who believe that the way to increase
health care quality and access is for govern-
ment to finance and control the delivery of
care. An example would be left-wing advoca-
cy groups such as Families USA.65 Expanding
SCHIP and Medicaid to enroll more and
more Americans serves their goal of eventual-
ly enrolling all Americans in government
health care programs. This incremental strat-
egy is neither new nor secretive. In 1993, the
Clinton administration’s Health Care Task
Force explicitly considered what it called a
“Kids First” strategy for health care reform
that would have first enrolled all children,
and eventually all adults, in a government-
controlled health care system.66
The “bootleggers” behind SCHIP expan-
sion include those who stand to gain finan-
cially from greater government subsidies for
health insurance and health care. They include
several lobbying groups: America’s Health
Insurance Plans, and the insurers it repre-
sents;67 the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America and the drug man-
ufacturers it represents; the American Medical
Association and the physicians it represents;
and the Federation of American Hospitals and
the for-profit hospitals it represents.68 State
officials who support SCHIP expansion, such
as California’s Governor Schwarzenegger69
and the rest of the National Governors
Association,70 also belong in the bootleggers
category because increasing federal SCHIP
spending benefits them politically: it enables
them to provide new subsidies to voters at a
fraction of the cost. 
Conclusion
The debate over expansion of the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program is
divorced from the reality of who truly needs
assistance and the forces that are making
health insurance increasingly unaffordable.
Congress should refocus government aid on
the truly needy, while allowing markets to
reduce their number. Deregulating health
insurance via competitive federalism would
make coverage affordable for more low-income
consumers, thereby reducing the demand for
government health care programs. Elimin-
ating the financial incentives that reward states
for making more Americans dependent on
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Medicaid and SCHIP would encourage states
to rededicate government health care pro-
grams to the truly needy, including the unin-
surable. With more Americans able to afford
private insurance, and no incentive for states to
expand government programs beyond the
truly needy, federal and state governments
could even reduce spending on those pro-
grams.
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